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Abstract
Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A
prosumer has a grid-connected decentralized production unit (DPU) and makes two
types of exchanges with the grid: energy imports when the local production is insuffi-
cient to match the local consumption and energy exports when local production exceeds
it. There exists two systems to measure the exchanges : a net metering system that
uses a single meter to measure the balance between exports and imports and a net
purchasing system that uses two meters to measure separately power exports and im-
ports. Both systems are currently used for residential consumption. We build a model
to compare the two metering systems. Under net metering, the price of exports paid to
prosumers is implicitly set at the price of the electricity that they import. We show that
net metering leads to (1) too many prosumers, (2) a decrease in the bills of prosumers,
compensated via a higher bill for traditional consumers, and (3) a lack of incentives to
synchronize local production and consumption.
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Prosumers are households that are both producers and consumers of electricity. A
prosumer has a decentralized production unit (DPU) – a rooftop photovoltaic system
(PV) or a small wind turbine – to produce electricity at home and this DPU is grid-
connected.
A generic autoconsumption profile of a residential DPU is provided in Figure 1.
Part of the electricity produced by a prosumer is consumed at home when production
and consumption are simultaneous. Production and consumption, though, are not
usually synchronized. When the local production does not match the consumption,
the prosumer uses the grid for the balance. If consumption exceeds production then
the prosumer draws electricity from the grid, like any other consumer. Conversely, if
production exceeds consumption then the excess power is supplied to the grid. There
are thus two distinct power exchanges between a prosumer and the grid: imports from
and exports to the grid. For residential consumers – the focus of this paper –, less than
30% of the electricity produced is consumed locally so that the remaining production
is exported to the grid.
Figure 1: Autoconsumption Profile (Source IEA-PVPS (2014))
From the consumer’s point of view, decentralized production units substitute tra-
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ditional generation units (from coal, gas or nuclear plants). From the energy system’s
point of view, an increased penetration of decentralized production technologies changes
both the total cost of electricity generation (including the environmental cost) and the
cost of the network. Power exchanges between prosumers and the grid generate costs
for the grid operator as they require additional investments in on-load tap changers to
support grid stability, in booster transformers to provide voltage support or in static
volt ampere reactive control to improve the reactiveness of the system (IEA-RETD
(2014)). The interplay between decentralized production and the grid cost is the sub-
ject of this paper. Grid costs will be passed through consumers and prosumers via the
distribution tariff i.e. the price consumers pay for using the network which accounts
for about 20 to 30% of the total electricity bill. Hence, this tariff, by affecting both the
costs and benefits of the DPU, will influence the rate of technology adoption.
To measure exchanges with the grid, residential prosumers are equipped with me-
ter(s). There are two alternative metering technologies for residential service : the
net metering and the net purchasing systems. With the net metering system1, there
is a unique meter that runs backwards when production exceeds consumption. The
meter only registers the difference between imports from and exports to the grid i.e.
net imports. With the net purchasing system2, there are two meters: a traditional one
to measure electricity drawn from the grid and an export meter to measure the power
supply to the grid. Whichever the system, the registered consumption is used as a basis
for billing. Currently, the two technologies are being used in Europe (see Figure 2 and
Poullikkas (2013) for detailed reviews). In the U.S, the net metering system is used in
43 states (DSIRE, 20163).
Net metering is a tool to finance decentralized energy production (Eid et al. (2014)).
With net metering local electricity production is valued at a price equal to the elec-
tricity retail price plus the unit network fee which represents the avoided cost/price
of electricity generated. Net metering is criticized on many grounds. For Brown and
Sappington (2016), it induces an inefficient deployment of distributed generation. Net
metering has also important redistributional consequences. As the registered consump-
tion decreases, the grid tariff has to increase so as to cover the network costs. This
1It is also known as the single metering system.
2The denomination dual or double metering and net billing are also often used in the literature.
3Informations collected from the DSIRE website www.dsireusa.org
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Figure 2: Net-metering vs net-billing in Europe (Source res-legal.eu)
leads to an important redistribution of income between prosumers and traditional con-
sumers (see Darghouth et al. (2011), Yamamoto (2012), Cai et al. (2013) or Brown
and Sappington (2016)). This rate increase makes decentralized production even more
profitable and stimulates further the DPU expansion; a death spiral in the words of
Borenstein and Bushnell (2015).
With net purchasing, prosumers can export electricity to the grid and they are
compensated for the power injection (via a feed-in-tariff). Electricity is either valued
at retail price or at a premium price. In addition, there might be specific network fees
charged by the grid operator for power injection.
In this paper, we show that the two metering technologies are not equivalent from
an economic point of view. There are at least three differences. First, as the costs for
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the prosumers may differ, the deployment of DPU is affected by the metering technol-
ogy. This in turn has an impact on the total cost of both electricity generation and
the grid. We will show that net metering will lead to too much prosumption. Second,
the two technologies differ in terms of income redistribution between the consumer
categories. In particular, net metering transfers the burden of the network cost to tra-
ditional users. Last, they induce different behavior with respect to self-consumption,
i.e. the consumption of self-generated renewable electricity. According to the Euro-
pean Commission (2015), self-consumption can lead to consumer empowerment and
a more efficient energy system. There exists complementary technologies (e.g. stor-
age) or demand side management practices (e.g load displacement, orientation of the
solar panels) that can increase the synchronization between decentralized production
and consumption. With net metering, self-consumption is not encouraged as exports
and self-consumption are perfect substitutes from the prosumer’s perspective but not
from the system’s perspective. With net purchasing, an increase in self-consumption
decreases the prosumers’ bill. Overall, our paper shows that net purchasing is a better
way to integrate prosumers in the energy system compared to net metering on these
dimensions. These conclusions are further confirmed by looking at various structures
for the grid tariffs and the positive externalities created by a green electricity produc-
tion. They tend to corroborate the recent trend among regulatory agencies in Europe
and the U.S towards a switch away from net metering policies.
Section 2 presents our general framework. The net metering and the net purchasing
systems are, respectively, exposed in Section 3 and Section 4. Both are compared in
Section 5 with respect to the deployment of decentralized production, the contribution
to the network financing of consumers and prosumers and the incentives to synchro-
nize production and consumption. The robustness of our results with respect to both
different grid tariff structures and environmental concerns are discussed in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes in the light of recent regulatory evolutions.
2 Model
We consider an electricity system with three categories of operators. Centralized elec-
tricity producers-retailers, a regulated Distribution System Operator (DSO) and con-
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sumers/prosumers. In our model, centralized electricity production is separated from
network activities as currently in Europe. Electricity production is considered to be a
competitive activity and the price p charged by producers is equal to the marginal cost
of centralized production. The DSO remains a monopolistic activity and regulation
consists in setting a distribution tariff such that the DSO breaks even. In this paper,
we set aside all the well documented incentive issues related to the regulation of the
DSO.4
2.1 Consumers and prosumers
We consider a population of residential consumers of size 1. These consumers have
the opportunity to install a DPU and become prosumers. A DPU producing k MWh
has an installation cost of zk. This cost depends on many factors. For example, for
solar panels, it depends on the solar irradiation level, housing characteristics (roof
orientation/size, etc.), technological costs, whether the household owns the place he
lives in, etc. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the installation cost z and
z is distributed on an interval [z, z¯] according to a given continuous distribution f(z)
and cumulative F (z). As a result, an (endogenous) proportion α of the population
become prosumers and a residual proportion (1 − α) remains traditional consumers.
Indeed, depending on the market or institutional conditions, only a fraction of agents
will choose to instal a DPU. We thus write α = F (z).
All consumers have the same energy consumption of q MWh and the energy demand
is supposed to be totally inelastic. We denote by S, the consumer’s gross (invariant)
surplus derived from consuming the energy flow q.
Electricity is sold by retailers at price p. Traditional consumers buy their whole
consumption on the market so that they pay pq to their electricity retailer. The decen-
tralized production unit of prosumers is connected to the grid. The size of the DPU
(k) may be limited by legal or regulatory constraints or by technical constraints such
as the roof size for solar panels. For instance, in some countries the (value of) excess
energy is credited to the next month and credit are set back to zero at the end of each
year (Dufo-Lopez and Bernal-Agustin (2015)). Other countries also limit the DPU ca-
4See Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) for a general overview.
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pacity to the actual consumption (k ≤ q). In our model, we will assume that the DPU
production is fixed and lower than actual consumption.
Production and consumption of a prosumer are not perfectly synchronized at any
point in time. We will denote by ϕ ≤ 1 the synchronization factor of a prosumer,
meaning that a prosumer consumes ϕk from its own production; the remaining (1−ϕ)k
being supplied to the grid. For a prosumer, a part ϕk of the total consumption q comes
from self-production while the other part (q − ϕk) comes from the grid. The total






α(q − ϕk) α(1− ϕ)k
(1− α)q q − αk
Legend. : Self-Consumption, : Imports, : Exports.
Figure 3: Exchanges with the grid
According to McLaren et al. (2015), in the U.S, on average 1/3 of the production
of solar energy is consumed at home. In none of the utilities analyzed, it exceeds 0.5.5
5For households, Bost et al. (2011) report a share of self-consumption ranging from 11.8% to 32.1%.
Lang et al. (2015) estimate a share of self-consumption of 40% for small residential buildings, this
share is increasing up to 80% for large residential buildings and even 90% for office buildings. This
difference can be explained by consumption patterns which are the highest for residential users when
the solar radiations tend to be lower (before and after average office working hours).
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This is confirmed in EIA-RETD (2014), which nevertheless acknowledges a forthcoming
rise due to technological advances in home storage facilities and the emergence of smart
appliances. The total power exchanges (imports+exports) of a prosumer are equal to
q + (1 − 2ϕ)k implying that there are more (resp. less) exchanges with the grid than
for traditional consumer if ϕ ≤ 0.5 (resp. ϕ ≥ 0.5). As our focus is on residential
consumption, we consider that ϕ < 0.5.
2.2 The grid
Grid costs The DSO is in charge of managing the distribution grid. The grid has both
fixed and variable costs. These variable costs are linked to electricity drawn from and
supplied to the network.6 We will denote by θ the cost per MWh of importing/exporting
power to/from the grid to/from the consumer. For simplicity’s sake, we suppose that
export costs are equal to import costs per MWh while casual evidences suggest that
power injections are more costly to manage. We also normalize to zero the export costs
from the centralized production units to the grid.7
With a proportion α of prosumers injecting (k − ϕk) on the grid, the total import
and export volumes, Vm and Vx are given by:
Vm = α(q − ϕk) + (1− α)q = q − αϕk,
Vx = α(1− ϕ)k.
The variable cost of the DSO is:
Cd (α) = cm (α) + cx (α) = (Vm + Vx)θ = (q + α (1− 2ϕ) k) θ, (1)
with cm (α) = (q − αϕk) θ being the costs of imports and cx (α) = α(1 − ϕ)kθ the
costs of exports. If ϕ < 0.5 (resp. ϕ > 0.5), the total cost of the grid increases (resp.
decreases) with the proportion of prosumers α. In addition, it should be noted that
6In the literature on the production technology of a DSO, the electricity distributed measured either
by the peak value or the total value is always a significant cost driver (see Jamasb and Pollitt (2001)
for a survey). To give an example, Coelli et al. (2013) estimate an average cost elasticity of 0.25 for
the electricity distributed with a significantly higher value in low density areas.
7This assumption is made without loss of generality as large power plants and the grid have usually
been highly entwined from both a historical and a technical point of view.
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self-consumption is a cost reducing activity for the grid as the cost decreases with the
parameter ϕ. The total cost of the grid is the sum of the variable cost Cd and the fixed
cost K.
Metering technology Consumers with a DPU are connected to the grid and their
exchange with the grid are measured by one or two meters. With net metering, the
meter measures the difference between imports q−ϕk and exports (1−ϕ)k. The meter
measures the net electricity flow q−k which is positive if the total consumption exceeds
the production and negative otherwise. In this paper, we restrict our attention to the
situation where k < q. Notice that measuring production k in addition is insufficient
to recover the full information about exports and imports unless ϕ is known. With net
purchasing, the meters record both imports and exports separately.
Grid regulation and distribution tariff The grid is regulated and the regulator
sets a grid tariff such that the DSO breaks even. From a very general point of view
grid tariffs are set as R = Cd (α)+K where R are the total grid fees paid by consumers
and prosumers to the DSO.
In the main part of the model, we will consider a non-discriminatory two-part tariff,
with the fixed part of the tariff set to cover the fixed cost and the variable part set to
cover the variable costs. This pricing for the utilities has been proposed by Coase (1946),
with a variable fee equal to marginal cost. With such a tariff structure, the fixed cost of
the grid can be ignored in the analysis. The non-discrimination constraint imposes that
prosumers and traditional consumers face the same rate for energy imports. In Section
6, we will relax these two assumptions and consider both a discriminatory tariff where
prosumers and consumers are charged a different rate and a Ramsey-like tariff where
the fixed grid cost (or part of it) must be covered by a markup on every consumed unit.
We will show that our results will not be qualitatively changed. Rather, the distortions
created by net metering would be amplified as one of the driver of our results is a
lower registered consumption under net metering. Therefore, the corresponding markup
would be higher in the net metering case.
In the case of net metering, the registered consumption is (Vm − Vx) and the unit
tariff r must be such that R = r(Vm − Vx) = Cd(α). In the case of net purchasing, the
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regulator can distinguish a tariff for imports rm and a tariff for exports rx. With net
purchasing, the tariff must be such that R = rmVm + rxVx = Cd(α).
2.3 First best level of prosumers
The total cost of producing and distributing electricity for the system8 is given by the




f(x)xdx, and the cost of network distribution, Cd(z) given above. Letting
α = F (z), the total cost is:
C(z) = Cg (z) + Cd (z) = (p+ θ) q − F (z) kp+H (z) k + F (z) (1− 2ϕ)kθ
The benevolent social planner minimizes C(z) with respect to z. The first-order condi-
tion9 can be rewritten as
f (z∗) k {−p+ z∗ + (1− 2ϕ)θ} = 0
⇒ z∗ = p+ (2ϕ− 1) θ (2)
Optimal prosumption defines an upper bound z∗ for consumers in the population that
become prosumers. A total of F (z∗) k MWh are generated by DPU, the remaining
F (z∗)(q − k) + (1− F (z∗))q by centralized production. We assume that z ≤ z∗ which
guarantees that there is a positive fraction of prosumers in the first best-case.
At the upper bound z∗, the marginal cost of 1 MWh of decentralized production
(z) must be equal to the marginal cost of centralized generation (p) corrected for the
additional network cost of decentralized production. This cost is zero, when ϕ = 0.5
i.e. when the imports perfectly balance the exports. If ϕ < 0.5, DPU generates more
costs than centralized production, while for ϕ > 0.5 it is the reverse. Therefore, z∗ < p
when ϕ < 0.5. When there are additional power exchanges, the installation cost of
DPU must be strictly lower than the cost of centralized production.
The characterization of z∗ in Equation (2) is similar to Brown and Sappington
(2017) for whom decentralized energy production should be valued at the marginal cost
8Only costs matter as surpluses are constant (by assumption).
9It leads to characterize a local minimum C(z) as C ′′(z∗) = f ′ (z∗) {0}+ f (z∗) k > 0.
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of centralized generation minus the additional network cost generated by decentralized
production. Because net-metering fails to take this second component into account
(energy is valued at the marginal cost of centralized generation), they conclude that
net metering is not optimal. We will show further that this effect is exacerbated by the
fact that the DSO charges a higher network price because grid-registered consumption
with the meter running backwards declines more than network costs.
3 Net metering
Suppose that the individual has only one meter. The net utility of installing PV for a
prosumer who has a PV installation of capacity k ≤ q is given by:
U(z) =
{
S − (p+ r)(q − k)− zk
S − (p+ r)q if
k > 0
k = 0
where r is the grid tariff per MWh. The consumer who is indifferent between purchasing
all its consumption from the grid and installing a DPU bears a marginal installation
cost z˜ such that:
z˜ = p+ r. (3)
At this bound z˜, the marginal installation cost is equal to the opportunity cost of
purchasing the electricity throughout the grid, p+r. With net metering, the opportunity
cost of DPU for the prosumer does not reflect its true cost for the system as a whole.
Indeed, there is an avoided network cost only if the electricity produced is self-consumed.
If not, electricity is exported at unit cost θ. However, from the prosumers’ point of
view, self-consumption and exports are equivalent. Self-consumed electricity replaces
centralized production which costs p+r. Exports offset imports that cost p+r. Hence,
there is a discrepancy between the opportunity cost perceived by the prosumer and the
true cost of decentralized production. In other words, even if exchanges with the grid
are charged at marginal cost (r = θ), there will be more prosumers than in the first
best for ϕ < 0.5.
The total cost of the grid is given by (1). With net metering and for any bound z,
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as the meter running backwards for prosumers, registered consumption is the difference
between imports and exports i.e. V˜ = Vm − Vx and is given by:
V˜ (z) = (1− F (z))q + F (z) (q − k) = q − F (z) k.
The break-even network rate is equal to the ratio between the total cost and the total




q − F (z)ϕk + F (z) (1− ϕ)k
q − F (z) k θ =
{
1 + 2
F (z) (1− ϕ) k
q − F (z) k
}
θ. (4)
Notice that, for F (z) > 0, the registered consumption V˜ is inferior to the total power
exchanges with the network Vm + Vx and therefore the network rate is higher than
the cost θ. In addition, the break-even network fee increases with the proportion of
prosumers: ∂r˜(z)/∂z > 0 and the size of DPU: ∂r˜(z)/∂k > 0.
From (3) and (4), one can derive the equilibrium10 z˜ with net metering such that
r˜ = r˜ (z˜) and
z˜ = z∗ + 2 (1− ϕ) q
q − F (z˜) kθ. (5)
Proposition 1 Net metering induces too much prosumption compared to the first best:
z˜ > z∗
This inefficiency is created by two distinct mechanisms. First, the opportunity cost
of decentralized production does not correspond to its true cost (compare Equations
(2) and (3)). This effect is enlightened in Brown and Sappington (2017). Second, the
network rate r increases, which further increases the benefit of prosuming. This rate
increases results from the combination of higher grid costs (exports more than com-
pensated reduced imports for ϕ > 0.5) and decreased registered consumption. Con-
sequently, the network fee is increased above the marginal cost thus reinforcing the
benefit of prosuming.
10Its existence is ensured if z¯ > p+ q−(2ϕ−1)kq−k θ.
12
4 Net purchasing
With two meters, one to measure the imports q − ϕk and another to measure the
exports k−ϕk, there is no decrease in the registered consumption as all the exchanges
are recorded. And, if ϕ ≤ 1
2
, there are more registered exchanges.
With net purchasing, when a prosumer exports power to the grid, it is bought back
at the price that we suppose to be equal to the retail price p. With two meters, the
DSO can charge a different rate for the imports (rm) and the exports (rx) but there is
no need to discriminate between prosumers and consumers. The net cost of a prosumer
with an installation of size k is given by
U(z) =
{
S − p(q − k)− rm (q − ϕk)− (1− ϕ) krx − zk




The consumer who is indifferent between purchasing all its consumption from the grid
and installing a DPU bears a marginal installation cost zˆ such that
zˆ = p+ ϕrm − (1− ϕ) rx (6)
For this prosumer zˆ, the marginal installation cost must reflect the opportunity cost
of purchasing the electricity which is now impacted by the grid tariff structure (rm, rx)
and by the share of self-consumption.
The total cost for the DSO is given by Equation (1) and this cost is identical to the
cost with net metering as long as the synchronization factor remains the same. The
meters register an import volume Vm equal to Vm = q−F (z)ϕk and an export volume
Vx equal to Vx = F (z) (1− ϕ)k. The break-even constraint for the DSO states that:
R ≡ rmVm + rxVx = Cd (z) ≡ θ (Vm + Vx)
This equation defines a locus of tariff (rm, rx) that guarantees that the DSO breaks-even:
rˆx (rm, z) = θ + (θ − rm) q − F (z)ϕk
F (z) (1− ϕ)k (7)
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The locus (rm, rx), represented on Figure 4, has two interesting properties. First, setting
the network fees rm and rx equal to the induced costs: rm = rx = θ belongs to the locus.
Second, the slope of the locus is (in absolute value) higher than one. This means that if
rm decreases by one, rx increases by a factor greater than one. The extreme values where
all the burden of the network cost is charged either on exports or on imports11 corre-
spond to
(























Figure 4: Break-even grid tariff with net purchasing
Solving (6) and (7), we can find the equilibrium zˆ with net purchasing compatible
with the break-even constraint for the DSO. This value is expressed as a function of
rm:
zˆ = z∗ +
q
F (zˆ) k
(rm − θ) (8)
One can see that whenever rm ≤ θ then zˆ ≤ z∗, while whenever θ < rm < r˜ then z∗ <
zˆ ≤ z˜. Finally when rm ≥ r˜ we have zˆ ≥ z˜. As the slope of the locus is higher than one,
moving along the locus and increasing the import fee, increases the number of DPU
11Under net purchasing, some DSO apply a network fee with a zero charge for exports.
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installations.
Proposition 2 Net purchasing leads to the first best level of prosumption with cost-
oriented grid tariffs: rm = rx = θ.
The net purchasing system is able to induce the first best – i.e. cost-minimizing
– level of DPU by setting import and export tariffs equal to cost. This was not the
case in the metering system associated with an excessive deployment of DPU. With
net purchasing, it is possible to construct a tariff that is fully cost reflective and that
induces the efficient deployment of DPU.
5 Comparisons
In this section, we compare the two metering technologies with respect to (1) the de-
ployment of decentralized production, (2) the contribution to the network financing of
consumers and prosumers and (3) the incentives to synchronize production and con-
sumption.
5.1 Deployment of DPU
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the first best level of DPU can be reached with a cost-
oriented tariff in the net purchasing case while it cannot be reached with net metering.
In this section, we show more generally that net metering is associated with a larger
deployment of DPU than net purchasing and that this result holds true for different rate
levels under net purchasing. The driving force behind this result is the lower registered
consumption under net metering.
Proposition 3 For all the break-even tariffs (rm, rx) with rm, rx ≥ 0, the deployment
of DPU is lower with net purchasing compared to net metering and the import fee is
lower: rm < r˜.
With net purchasing, moving the locus defined in Equation (7) and decreasing rx
below θ stimulates the deployment of DPU. The proposition shows that even if all
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the grid costs is recovered with import fees, the deployment of DPU is still lower than
under net metering. The import fee is also lower. To replicate z˜ with the net purchasing
system, the regulator should set negative export fees.
5.2 Redistribution and equity
The metering technology and the tariff structure do not only have an influence on the
deployment of distributed generation. The burden of the network cost is shared differ-
ently with the two technologies. In this section, we analyze the redistributive impact
of the grid tariff. To analyze this, let us compare the consumers’ and the prosumers’
contribution to the network financing under net metering and net purchasing.
For that, we use as a reference point a cost reflective tariff under net purchasing:
rm = rx = θ. This solution leads to the efficient deployment of DPU: zˆ = z
∗. With net
purchasing, the network bill of a consumer (Rc) and a prosumer (Rp) are respectively
equal to:
Rˆc = rmq = θq
Rˆp = rm(q − ϕk) + rx(1− ϕ)k = θ (q + k(1− 2ϕ))
With net purchasing, prosumers who are making more power exchanges with the grid
(if ϕ < 0.5) contribute more to the grid financing: Rˆp > Rˆc and the contribution of
consumers and prosumers corresponds to the induced cost. Notice that with a cost-
oriented tariff, the bills are independent of the DPU deployment.
With net metering, the bill of the two types of consumers are equal to:
R˜c = r˜q and R˜p = r˜(q − k)
where r˜ = r˜(z˜). Compared to the benchmark, net metering increases the bill for the
traditional consumers R˜c > Rˆc. Reasons for this are multiple. Firstly, only net imports
are recorded for prosumers meaning that the registered consumption declines leading
to an increase in the grid tariff. Secondly, this effect is further exacerbated by the fact
that grid costs increase as prosumers are making more power exchanges with the grid
(ϕ < 0.5) and the deployment of DPU is above the first best level (z˜ > z∗).
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For prosumers, the rate is increased compared to the benchmark but the recorded
consumption is reduced. As Rˆp−R˜p = 2θk(1−ϕ)q 1−F (z˜)
q−F (z˜)k > 0, the later effect dominates
the former. We thus have:
Proposition 4 Compared to net purchasing with cost oriented tariffs, with net me-
tering the consumers’ bill increases while the prosumers’ bill decreases: Rˆc < R˜c and
Rˆp > R˜p.
The metering technologies not only differ with respect to DPU deployment but
they have an important redistributive impact. Traditional consumers pay more with
net metering while prosumers pay less and the burden of the grid cost is transferred to
traditional consumers.12 This effect could be quite important as if k → q, the prosumer’s
contribution to the network approaches zero and the whole burden is transferred to
consumers (creating even more inadequate incentives to adopt a DPU).
Finally, notice that if the regulator departs from cost-oriented grid pricing and
decreases the import fee, the result of Proposition 4 continues to hold true: with net
purchasing, consumers are still paying less and prosumers are paying more. To show
this, we use Proposition 3 and we compute the bill of the two types of consumers
corresponding to the tariff (rm, rx) = (r¯m, 0). With such a tariff, we have a deployment
of DPU above the first best level:




(r¯m − θ) < z˜. (9)
The corresponding consumer’s payments are given by:
Rˆc = r¯mq
Rˆp = r¯m(q − ϕk)
Because r¯m(zˆ) < r˜(z˜), we have Rˆ
c < R˜c and Rˆp > R˜p. Again the driving force behind
this result is the decline in registered consumption with net metering and the transfer
of the grid cost to the non-prosumers.
12This corroborates the empirical work of Picciariello et al. (2015) which shows substantial cross-
subsidies from consumers toward prosumers for six U.S states.
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5.3 Incentives to synchronize production and consumption
An important parameter of the model is the synchronization factor ϕ. Synchronization
of consumption and production reduces both electricity exports and imports of pro-
sumers hence the grid costs. For this reason, it is efficient to have a higher deployment
of DPU when synchronization increases i.e. ∂z∗/∂ϕ > 0. Or differently, for a given z,
the grid cost decreases when synchronization increases: ∂C (z) /∂ϕ = −2F (z) kθ < 0.
There are many technologies that prosumers can use to synchronize local production
and consumption (Luthander et al. (2015) and IEA PVPS (2016)), the most obvious
being residential energy storage. Residential sodium-ion or lithium-ion based batteries
are becoming increasingly popular. A power-to-heat system that converts the solar
electricity into heat that can be stored through a heat pump, before the final usage, is
a low-cost alternative storage technology. Besides storage, various demand side man-
agement practices also encourage self-consumption. For example, load shifting can take
place manually or via a specific device that shifts on and off heating or air conditioning
appliances, depending on production conditions. Alternatively, synchronization can be
influenced when choosing the orientation of the photovoltaic panels at the installation
stage in order to better align power production and consumption. In this section, we
look at the grid tariff as an incentive mechanism to encourage better synchronization
of production and consumption.
Suppose that a prosumer can at some cost increase synchronization between con-
sumption and local production. The cost of synchronization is increasing and convex;
at the margin, it is even more costly to match consumption and production. Let us de-
note the initial level of synchronization by ϕ¯ and the cost of increasing synchronization
above ϕ¯ by the function (ϕ−ϕ¯)2/2. Our objective is to look at the individual incentives
to increase synchronization. Note that we have considered that the parameter ϕ is iden-
tical for all prosumers. Therefore, the second order effect of an increase in ϕ measured
by ∂r/∂ϕ captures the impact on the grid tariff of an increase in the synchronization
parameter of all prosumers. In our analysis focused on individual incentives, we will
consider exclusively on first order effects, i.e. we will consider that the impact of an
individual increase in ϕ has a negligible impact on the grid tariff.
First let us identify the levels of z and ϕ that are jointly optimal. A benevolent
social planner would solve the problem minϕ,z C(z) + F (z)
(ϕ−ϕ¯)2
2
for which the interior
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solution writes:





= p+ 2kθ2 − θ
Synchronization is socially desirable as it reduces the grid cost and it also implies a
lower optimal level of prosumption compared to z∗. When synchronization devices are
properly adjusted, less prosumption is needed at the optimum: synchronization and
prosumption are substitutes for reducing the total cost of the energy system. We then
investigate whether the metering systems manage to implement this first best.
Proposition 5 Net metering does not provide incentives for synchronization while it
is socially desirable. Net purchasing can lead to first best levels of prosumption and
synchronization jointly with cost-oriented grid tariffs.
With net metering, the utility of a prosumer (z ≤ z˜) is given by:
U˜(z) = S − (p+ r˜)(q − k)− zk.
This utility is independent of the synchronization level and net metering does not pro-
vide incentives for synchronization so the equilibrium synchronization with net metering
is then ϕ˜ ≡ argmaxϕ U˜(z)− (ϕ−ϕ¯)
2
2
= ϕ¯. With net metering, prosumers will not invest
to increase the synchronization between consumption and production.
With net purchasing, the grid applies a tariff (rˆm, rˆx) defined by Equation (7). At
this tariff, the utility of a prosumer (z ≤ zˆ) is
Uˆ(z) = S − (q − k)p− rˆm (q − ϕk)− (1− ϕ) krˆx − zk.
Thus, the utility of a prosumer increases with the synchronization factor. A larger
fraction of self-consumption decreases both imports and exports and therefore the grid







⇒ ϕˆ = ϕ¯+ (rˆm + rˆx)k
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Cost-oriented grid tariffs lead to the first best level of DPU installation and provide
adequate incentives for prosumers to synchronize their production and their consump-
tion. With rm = rx = θ, we have both ϕ˜ = ϕ∗ and z˜ = z∗ϕ.
Our comparisons show that net purchasing is superior to net metering in all the
three dimensions considered. With a cost oriented grid tariff, the first best deployment
of DPU will be achieved with net purchasing while net metering will lead to excessive
prosumption. On top of that, net metering transfers the burden of the grid cost to
the non-prosumers, which raises equity concerns and does not provide any incentives
to synchronize local production and consumption. Our model, therefore, provides a
strong case against net metering.
6 Extensions
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results with respect to different grid
tariffs structures than those discussed in the main analysis. We also consider the fact
that the DPU creates an externality at the system level by encouraging the production
of green electricity.
6.1 Alternative tariff structures
6.1.1 Discriminatory network tariff
The inefficiency described in Proposition 1 can be potentially overcome by having a
discriminatory import tariff: rc for consumers, and rp for prosumers.
13 Differentiating
tarifs can be used to align network fees with induced costs which is a major concern
with net metering.
With a discriminatory tarif, the net utility of having a DPU is defined as:
U(z) =
{
S − (p+ rp)(q − k)− zk




13This is the case in Belgium: prosumers are connected with a single meter (net metering) and some
DSO apply a specific prosumer fee to compensate for network costs. This prosumer fee is linked to
the power installed (approximately 80 euros per KVA).
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The indifferent consumer bears a marginal installation cost z˜′ such that:






With a discriminatory import tariff, a way to dampen excessive prosuming is to increase
the prosumer’s rate and/or decrease the consumer’s rate. With net metering and a
discriminatory tariff, the regulator sets an import tariff rc for consumers and rp for
prosumers. Total receipts are:
R = rc(1− F (z))q + rpF (z) (q − k).
The locus of break-even network rates (rc, rp) is equal to
r˜p (z) =
Cd (z)




q − k . (11)
From Equations (10) and (11), one can easily determine that there exists a discrimina-
tory tariff structure (r˜c, r˜p) such that the DSO breaks even and the first best level for
DPU is achieved, i.e. z˜′ = z∗.
Proposition 6 Net metering with a discriminatory network tariff leads to the first best
level of prosumption when r˜c = θ and r˜p =
θ
q−k (q + (1− 2ϕ) k).
Comparing r˜c, r˜p and r˜ shows that r˜p (z
∗) ≥ r˜ (z˜) ≥ r˜c (z∗) as:
r˜p − r˜c = 2θ k
q − k (1− ϕ) ≥ 0
r˜p − r˜ = 2kqθ (1− ϕ) (1− F (z˜))
(q − k) (q − F (z˜) k) ≥ 0
Discriminatory net-metering tariffs restore efficiency of net-metering when the con-
sumer’s rate is reduced to marginal cost and the prosumer’s rate is above the uniform
net metering rate. The discriminatory tariff is such that the contribution of each cat-
egory of consumer to the network financing is equal to the induced cost. Traditional
consumers are charged at marginal cost θ. The rate for prosumers is adjusted to take
into account the increased exchanges with the grid and the decreased registered con-
sumption. This accords with the idea in Bennear and Stavins (2007) that it is easier
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to reach the first best with two instruments rather than one. For this reason, the first
best can also be achieved with net metering if the tariff applied to the two categories of
consumer is different. Efficiency is restored with such a tariff and net metering must be
combined with a discriminatory network tariff. As regards the third dimension of our
comparison, however incentives for synchronization are still missing as self-generated
and imported energy are seen as perfect substitutes for the prosumers under net me-
tering, which is not the case at the system level.
6.1.2 No fixed fee
Previously in the analysis, we considered that the fixed cost of the grid K is covered
by a fixed connection fee paid by consumers and prosumers. In this section, we relax
this hypothesis and we suppose that R = Cd(α) +K.
With net metering, the regulator must inflate the grid fee by K
Vm−Vx to cover the
fixed cost, so that:
˜˜r(z) = r˜ +
K
q − ϕk .
Such a mark-up obviously makes prosuming even more attractive and the inefficiency
result of Proposition 1 is further exacerbated.




ˆˆrx (rm, z) = θ + (θ − rm) q − F (z)ϕk
F (z) (1− ϕ)k +
K
F (z)(1− ϕ)k . (12)
Solving (6) and (12), we find that:





(rm − θ)− K
F (ˆˆz)k
(13)
The first best (ˆˆz = z∗) can still be achieved by setting







With net purchasing, it is possible to achieve the first best for different tariff structure,
including Ramsey-like tariffs where costs are only covered by variable fees.
To sum up, we find that considering fixed costs of the grid do not alter the main
results previously derived in the analysis (i.e. Propositions 1 and 2). Naturally, Ramsey-
like tariffs must be substituted to marginal cost based ones when net purchasing applies.
6.2 The environmental impact of DPU
An important feature of DPU is their ability to produce the so called ”green electric-
ity” and the environmental impact of renewable energies constitutes a non negligible
motivation for regulators to promote the deployment of DPU. Taking the environmen-
tal impact of DPU into account, the excessive deployment with net metering should
be further qualified. Environmental friendly DPU, like photovoltaic panels or small
wind turbines, generate less greenhouse gas emissions than centralized energy produc-
tion based on gas or coal. To take it into account, suppose that the total system
cost C(z) is increased by an additional environmental damage function D(E) where
E = q−F (z) k are the carbon emissions per MWh produced by centralized generators.
And let us consider that this damage function is linearD (E) = δE with δ > 0. The
total cost is rewritten as:
C(z) = Cg (z) + Cd (z) + δ (q − F (z) k)
Thus, the social cost minimizing prosumer’s cutoff increases now to ze = z∗ + δ.
To reach this environmental goal, regulators can either manipulate the grid tariff to
foster the deployment of DPU or introduce specific subsidizing schemes. We analyze
these two options for both metering technologies.
6.2.1 The grid supports to DPU
With net purchasing, the grid tariff can be used easily to reach environmental targets.
By increasing rm and decreasing rx along the locus given in Equation (7), zˆ increases.
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More specifically, the following tariff couple (rm, rx) leads to zˆ = z
e:
rm = θ +
F (z)k
q
δ and rx = θ − q − F (z)ϕk
q(1− ϕ) δ.
Notice that for sufficiently large value of the marginal damage δ, the export fee may
become negative rx < 0. In this case, it might be optimal to compensate prosumers for
their exports as it is a means of subsidizing decentralized production. The mechanism is
then similar to a feed-in premium. Note also that such a subsidy reduces the incentives
to synchronize local production and consumption.
With net metering, if ze ≤ z˜, then net metering already provides too much support
to DPU and the first best cannot be reached. On the contrary, if ze ≥ z˜, then to
increase the DPU penetration further, the grid tariff must increase. An increase in the
grid tariff either leaves a positive profit to the grid operator or it can be achieved by
lowering the fixed fee charge to consumers. The two solutions are problematic. The
first solution implies that the DSO is collecting rents paid by consumers. The second
solution by decreasing the fixed fee would exacerbate redistribution concerns discussed
above. Both solutions might be problematic to implement for a regulator. For these
reasons, we conclude that net purchasing is a more effective device than net metering
in order to internalize the environmental impacts of DPU, should this be done by using
the grid tariff.
6.2.2 Net metering and feed-in premium
As an alternative, a specific supporting scheme for DPU can be installed independently
of the grid tariff. In many countries, decentralized energy production is subsidized and
sometimes heavily (Schmalensee, 2012). There are different supporting mechanisms:
feed-in tariffs (FIT), feed-in premium (FIP) or renewable portfolio standards (RPS).14
These mechanisms offer a subsidy for each MWh produced from a green source. This
requires a metering system that measures the production of the DPU, the green meter.
In this subsection, we analyse the impact of combining a feed-in premium with a
net metering system. We suppose that ze ≥ z˜ meaning that additional support should
be provided to reach the first best. Under a feed-in premium (FIP) scheme, prosumers
14See Ringel (2006) for a comparison.
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receive a premium ρ > 0 in addition to the market price p for each MWh they produce
and the production k is measured with a green meter. Prosumers thus receive a total
premium ρk. We suppose that the FIP is organized and financed by the DSO. Thus, the
DSO charges a unit tax τ on each registered consumption unit. This green fund must
balanced: total premium F (z)ρk should be equal to the tax receipts τ (q − F (z) k).
The fund is balanced if:
τ (ρ) = ρ
F (z) k
q − F (z) k (14)
The regulatory problem is then to set the grid fee r, the premium ρ and the tax
τ to reach the first best level of DPU (ze) subject to the break-even constraints for
the DSO (Equation 4) and the green fund (Equation 14). The indifferent consumer
is characterized by z′ (ρ) = p + r + ρ + τ (ρ). Setting z′ = ze and replacing r by the
break-even value given in Equation ( 4), we have the optimal FIP:
ρ′ = δ
q − F (z∗ + δ) k
q
− 2 (1− ϕ) θ
Interestingly, the premium is not necessarily increasing with the environmental damage.
Indeed a larger damage increases the benefit of decentralized production (ze increases
in δ). With net metering, an increase in DPU reduces registered consumption (and
increases the grid costs) which in turn increases the grid tarif. As a result the supporting
scheme is less powerful and may be lowered when environmental damage is important.
Combined with a FIP, the first best can be achieved with net metering.
Proposition 7 If ze ≥ z˜, net metering metering leads to the first best level of pro-
sumption if combined with a FIP ρ′.
Proposition 7 echoes Proposition 6 : Net metering should be combined with an-
other instrument to reach the first best level of prosumption. Still, redistribution and
synchronization issues are not addressed the same way with the two technologies.
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7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to study how residential prosumers should be integrated
into the electricity grid by comparing the net metering/purchasing systems in three
dimensions. These conclusions corroborate the recent claims made by various regulatory
and governmental institutions.
First, we find that the net metering system tends to overencourage investments in
decentralized production units, as the price at which the electricity sold by the pro-
sumers via the grid is implicitly set at the retail price. Hence, self-generated electricity
is sold by prosumers to the grid with a positive margin. As claimed by the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC (2016)), the simplicity of
the net metering system in times when PV systems were available at a high cost has
made it a practical way to integrate prosumers into the energy grid. However, with an
increasing fraction of prosumers, the system quickly becomes financially unsustainable
for the grid operator. The concomitant dropping prices for rooftop PV and financial
supports at the local, regional and federal levels (via subsidies and tax cuts), have led
to a massive rise of PV’s. By not tying the hands of the regulator who has to set the
same tariff for electricity imports and exports, the net purchasing system does not face
this issue. Hence, as coined by European Commission (2015), the net metering is very
attractive from the point of view of prosumers but not for the energy system.
Second, the traditional residential users cross-subsidize prosumers. As the network
costs are socialized via the energy tariff, traditional users will pay a higher energy bill.
Recent empirical works such as De Groote et al. (2016) have shown that wealthier
households far more often install sola PV’s, a.o. as they own and are lodging in a
house. Hence, this issue translates in terms of wealth distribution. Rising concerns for
energy poverty in times where electricity prices tend to increase and 20 to 30% of it is
made of tariffs further challenges the limits of net metering systems.
Third, as also argued by the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER (2017)),
net metering does not encourage self-consumption by the prosumers, who see electricity
imports via the grid and self-consumption as perfect substitutes. In other words, net
metering policies will not provide accurate price signals to synchronize consumption
and production. For example, prosumers will not choose the orientation of photovoltaic
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panels to displace their energy consumption or to invest in storage capacities to improve
synchronization. In other words, self consumption is discouraged while it is beneficial at
the energy system level and prosumers will use “the grid to artificially store electricity
”(European Commission (2015), p. 10).
Our message in favor of a net purchasing system is robust to the extensions related to
the tariff structure and the environmental externality created by DPU. At the very least,
net metering will not encourage self-consumption and it requires the costly installation
of an additional green meter. These various arguments explain why many countries
across the Atlantic have somehow decided to limit their net metering programmes.
Seemingly it follows a clear-cut result in favor of a net-purchasing approach that
calls for an empirical validation. Unfortunately electricity prosumption is quite a recent
phenomenon and data at the residential level are insufficiently abundant.15 Building
an empirical evidence will be a key issue for future research. An experimental approach
might alleviate some of the issues faced by real-life data. We believe that developing
convincing empirical evidence about the impact of the modes of integration of prosumers
to the grid will be a challenge for future research.
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